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A Path to Peace: Thoughts on
Olympic Revenue and the IOC/
USOC Divide
Tim Elcombe
Stephen Wenn
U.S. Public Law 95-606 (otherwise known as the Amateur Sports Act), passed in 1978,
has contributed significantly to the relationship between the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) for the past thirty years.
Exclusive rights to the use of Olympic marks and emblems in the U.S. territory granted to
it in the Amateur Sports Act were leveraged by the USOC to obtain amounts of Olympicgenerated revenue from the sale of television rights fees and major corporate sponsorships
far larger than any of the other National Olympic Committees (NOCs) recognized by the
IOC. This privileged financial position has become a divisive issue for the USOC, IOC, and
the world’s 204 other NOCs. The IOC and USOC have agreed to commence discussions
towards the establishment of a revised method to distribute Olympic revenue to members
of the Olympic Tripartite (IOC, NOCs, and International Sport Federations). We suggest
broadening this discussion to include a move to increase the amount of money from these
sources transferred to Olympic Organizing Committees (OCOGs) to support a more formalized legacy plan for Olympic athletic facilities in host cities, and adding a new sponsor
category to the existing corporate sponsorship program, The Olympic Partners (TOP), to
enhance the IOC’s commitment to social responsibility and sustainability. We also propose
a new formula for the distribution of Olympic television and corporate sponsorship revenue
as a means of contributing to this dialogue that must target a mutually acceptable resolution
in order to foster a more harmonious working relationship between the IOC and USOC.
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Introduction

I

n early 2011, the IOC is preparing to vote in July for the right to host
the 2018 Olympic Winter Games, an honor chased by Annecy (France),
Munich (Germany), and Pyeongchang (South Korea), and continues to liaise with British organizers during the crucial run up to the 2012 London
Olympics. Both tasks are justifiably absorbing the attention of IOC officials;
however, their energies are also being expended to solve a dispute concerning
the distribution of Olympic revenue, which has compromised IOC/USOC
relations in recent years.
The dispute dates to the 1980s, when the USOC successfully leveraged its exclusive rights to the use of the Olympic rings in U.S. territory
to secure sums of money from domestic Olympic television contracts and
the revenue accrued by the Olympic Program (now The Olympic Partners,
TOP), a worldwide corporate sponsorship program conceived by former
IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch in order to diversify the Olympic
Movement’s revenue base, that was both envied and resented by the world’s
other NOCs, leaders of the International Sport Federations (ISFs), and IOC
members based in Europe. The envy and resentment rose to such levels that
the efforts of Chicago to acquire the right to host the 2016 Olympic Games
were compromised. Recent productive dialogue between IOC executives and
the USOC’s leadership tandem of Larry Probst and Scott Blackmun offers
the possibility for an era of improved bilateral relations, but this desirable
outcome hinges on identifying and enacting mutually acceptable changes
to the current distribution of Olympic commercial revenue.
In this paper, we offer our thoughts on how the IOC and USOC might
approach the immediate need to reach an agreement (in advance of a 2013
deadline), while also exploring means of improving financial support for
Olympians from developing nations, enhancing the post-Olympic use of
Olympic venues, and extending the Olympic Movement’s commitment to
sustainability.
Background
In the 1970s, a widespread consensus existed in the United States that a
dysfunctional managerial support structure compromised the efforts of the
country’s athletes on the international stage, most notably in Olympic competition. Soviet and East German athletes increasingly overshadowed U.S.
Olympians in the 1960s and 1970s, and in a Cold War environment such a
reality required redress. Washington lawmakers, who found their motivation
to take action in the wake of the country’s poor showing at the 1972 Munich Olympics, targeted a solution for the internecine disputes between the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the Amateur Athletic
Union (AAU), both of whom had long jockeyed for power and authority in
U.S. Olympic matters. This rivalry was viewed as a major contributing factor
to the malaise concerning U.S. Olympic fortunes. Passed by U.S. legislators
in 1978, Public Law 95-606, more commonly known as the Amateur Sports
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Act (ASA), reflected the government’s effort to streamline the administration of the nation’s Olympic affairs.
The new administrative framework of the USOC, birthed by the ASA,
resulted in the emasculation of the AAU, removing its national governing
status for eight Olympic sports. This action placated the NCAA whose
withdrawal from the U.S. Olympic scene in 1972 occurred as a result of its
disenchantment with the AAU’s power. Authority of U.S. Olympic affairs
was placed squarely under the auspices of the revamped USOC.1 While the
USOC’s administrative structure required further renovation in ensuing
years, and excessive turnover at the executive level plagued the organization
in the last decade,2 the ASA (modified and rebranded as the Ted Stevens
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act in 1998)3 confirmed the USOC’s control
of Olympic-related decision making in the United States.
In 1978, few U.S. federal legislators were likely to have perceived the
seeds of conflict they sowed between the USOC and the IOC. But in delivering peace to the U.S. Olympic
community, Washington pol- But in delivering peace to the U.S.
iticians established a second
theater of conflict. American Olympic community, Washington
legislators granted the USOC politicians established a second
the exclusive rights to the use
of the Olympic five-ring logo theater of conflict.
and other related marks and
emblems in U.S. territory.4 This decision occurred before the IOC attempted
to secure exclusive ownership of the five-ring logo in the early 1980s, via
the World Intellectual Property Organization, 5 and preceded the IOC’s
emergence as an economic juggernaut in the 1980s under Juan Antonio
Samaranch, the IOC’s seventh President. As a result of the powers granted
to the USOC under the legislation, the ASA has been a significant factor in
shaping IOC/USOC relations since the early 1980s.6
As the value of Olympic television rights climbed, and Samaranch’s
plans for diversifying the IOC’s revenue base by establishing an international
corporate sponsorship program evolved, the USOC soon grasped the economic value of its domestic ownership of the Olympic rings. Negotiations
between the IOC and USOC ensued. Without sponsor access to the lucrative
U.S. market, TOP would have been still-born. Samaranch and his IOC colleagues also understood the futility of a legal challenge to the ASA. These
facts compelled the IOC to reach an agreement with the USOC. In 1985,
the IOC ceded 15 percent of all revenue accrued by Samaranch’s brainchild,
TOP, to the USOC in exchange for waiving its exclusive rights to the use of
the logo in the United States.7 The following year, as a result of the USOC’s
threat to prevent advertisers’ use of the Olympic rings in commercials on
U.S. Olympic broadcasts in 1988, the IOC agreed to send $15 million to the
USOC (an expense shared equally by the IOC and the Calgary and Seoul
Olympic Organizing Committees), and transfer 10 percent of all future
(1992 and beyond) U.S. Olympic television contracts to Colorado Springs,
the site of the USOC’s headquarters and its principal training facility for
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the country’s aspiring Olympians.8 This agreement was enshrined in the
Broadcast Marketing Agreement (BMA) reached between the two bodies in
March 1986.
Buoyed by the legal weight of the ASA, the USOC continues to enjoy
its singular financial status as the “Have NOC” with respect to IOC-generated revenue with its share dwarfing those allocated to the other 204 NOCs
worldwide. Between 2005 and 2008 the USOC received $298,154,000 via
TOP, its share of the U.S. Olympic television contracts, and television deals
in other markets. The remaining 204 NOCs shared $393,082,000.9
Samaranch’s presidency (1980–2001) witnessed numerous skirmishes
between the USOC, which sought to enhance the terms of the agreements
concerning the distribution of television and corporate sponsorship money,
and the IOC, which resisted these overtures. The USOC pursued these
changes in face-to-face discussions with IOC officials and through its lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill.10 In seeking assistance from Washington
politicians, the USOC hoped for legislative action that would enhance its
powers granted under the ASA. In particular, the USOC wanted the authority to negotiate the U.S. television deals in order to set its share of television
revenue without the need for IOC input.
Jacques Rogge’s presidency (2001–present) has not been immune to
these tensions. Currently, the USOC receives 12.75 percent of the U.S. television contract and 20 percent of the money generated by the TOP program
(remembering that a portion of the global sum from the program takes
the form of VIK, or value-in-kind donations). In the past three years, the
IOC’s European members unleashed their (verbal) arrows in an attempt to
diminish the USOC’s share of these revenue sources, noting that one of
the USOC’s major arguments—namely that the U.S. market provides the
vast majority of the money—is no longer valid. European and Asian television networks are providing increasing sums of money and have been for
over a decade, while non-American multinational companies outnumbered
American-based ones in support of the most recent Olympic Winter Games
in Vancouver.11 The USOC, under the chairmanship of Peter Ueberroth, was
unwilling to approve any proposal that would reduce the overall amount
of money flowing to the USOC. Given that this money funds 50 percent of
the USOC’s budget, his stance was predictable.12
Chicago 2016, the bid committee championing the city’s pursuit of
the 2016 Olympic Games, was caught in the crossfire between the IOC and
USOC leading up to the final
Anti-American sentiment within vote at the IOC’s Copenhagen
Session in October 2009. Antithe IOC, largely whipped up American sentiment within
by its European cohort . . . the IOC, largely whipped up
by its European cohort who
compromised Chicago’s efforts. pressed for a reduction in the
USOC’s share of Olympic revenue, compromised Chicago’s efforts. Larry Probst, who succeeded Ueberroth in late 2008, agreed to engage in discussions with IOC officials com-
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mencing in 2013 concerning a new distribution method (to be implemented
post-2020) when he gleaned that Chicago’s grip on the Olympic chalice had
been loosened, in no small measure due to the ongoing conflict. It was too
little, too late. Aided by its adept staging of the 2007 Pan-American Games,
Rio de Janeiro’s successful bid also benefited greatly from its representatives’ passionate call for the Olympics to be awarded to South America for
the first time.13
The IOC left a good deal of money on the table by walking away from
what would have been an energized U.S. corporate community and an extremely competitive U.S television rights environment if Chicago prevailed.
Chicago’s loss was also a financial blow for the USOC because its domestic
sponsorship program would have benefited from the selection of the U.S.
city. Furthermore, U.S. television executives would pay more for the U.S.
Olympic television rights if the Games had been awarded to Chicago as
opposed to any of the other finalists (Rio de Janeiro, Madrid, and Tokyo).
This, too, would have worked in the USOC’s financial favor because of its
percentage share of the U.S. television contract.
Undoubtedly, one can make a solid argument from the IOC’s perspective for extending the Olympic brand to South America, and demonstrating
regard for the ambulatory mission of the Olympic Games. However, a more
harmonious working relationship between the IOC and USOC is in the
best interests of the Olympic Movement. Powerbrokers within America’s
Olympic hierarchy understand that any U.S. city’s quest to host an Olympic
festival will founder
on the rocks in the A more harmonious working relationship
absence of a resolution. Recent out- between the IOC and USOC is in the
reach efforts by the best interests of the Olympic Movement.
USOC’s new CEO,
Scott Blackmun, and Powerbrokers within America’s Olympic
Larry Probst, augur hierarchy understand that any U.S. city’s
well for a respectful future dialogue quest to host an Olympic festival will
b e t w e e n t h e t w o founder on the rocks in the absence of
sides.14 Further confirmation that the a resolution.
two sides were looking for common ground on revenue matters occurred in September 2010,
when the USOC agreed to send $18 million to the IOC to solve the “games
cost” issue in relation to the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games and
the 2012 London Olympics.15
Crux of the Dispute
The USOC’s case for a disproportionate share of Olympic revenue generated
from the sale of U.S. television rights and TOP sponsorships rests largely on
the existence of the ASA, a U.S. federal statute. With respect to Samaranch’s
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plans for TOP, the USOC claimed that they encroached on its exclusive
rights to the use of Olympic marks and emblems in the U.S. market, and
its consent to the proposal required financial concessions from the IOC.
USOC officials argued that the U.S.-based companies that dominated the
prospective list of multinationals that might value the use of the Olympics
as an international marketing platform in the mid-1980s otherwise would
have been pursued as domestic (USOC) sponsors. This (alleged) financial
sacrifice triggered its decision to uphold the terms of the ASA and seek
compensation.16
The USOC’s belief that U.S. companies would gravitate to TOP sponsorships proved accurate as they provided 77.8 percent of the $96 million
raised by the program in its inaugural quadrennial (1985–1988).17 When the
IOC agreed to the Broadcast Marketing Agreement in 1986, U.S. television
networks, ABC and NBC respectively, provided the lion’s share of global
television revenue (83.7 percent) for the upcoming 1988 Calgary Winter and
Seoul Summer Olympics ($609 million of the $727.5 million global sum).18
The IOC could neither deny its financial dependence on the U.S. market, nor
expect any U.S. court to overturn the terms of the ASA. The USOC benefited
greatly from the financial boost afforded by the evolution of TOP and the
signing of the BMA.
Over the past two decades, as the influences of globalization wrought
major changes to the international economic order, the U.S. market’s
percentage contribution to IOC coffers declined. For the 2009 to 2012
quadrennial, American firms will supply 52.6 percent and 44 percent of
the television revenue and TOP funds respectively; however, recent deals
reached with Procter & Gamble and Dow Chemical will enhance the latter
figure.19 IOC officials counter the USOC’s argument concerning U.S.-based
companies’ contribution to the marketing program’s overall revenue with
the knowledge that these businesses employ people in many countries and
rely on revenue generated by the sale of their products around the globe.
In a globalized economy, the TOP fees paid to the IOC also emanate from
subsidiaries located outside the United States. At the IOC’s headquarters in
Lausanne, Switzerland, there is resentment that the U.S. government does
not fund a portion of the USOC’s operational budget in the fashion that
other federal governments do for NOCs around the globe. The IOC, in this
sense, believes it is funding 50 percent of the USOC’s budget, and considers
this situation untenable.20 Without access to the U.S. market, USOC officials
remind their IOC counterparts, the value of a TOP sponsorship would be
significantly diminished—less money for everyone. Then, too, NBC has still
been supplying over 50 percent of the sum raised from the sale of Olympic
television rights around the globe in recent years. And so it goes.
At this time, we wish to propose specific suggestions for the IOC and
USOC in order to resolve their differences on the distribution of Olympic
television and corporate sponsorship revenue, and in the process, better
serve the needs of athletes worldwide, while further advancing the IOC’s
commitment to social responsibility, safeguarding the financial interests
of taxpayers in Olympic host communities, and promoting sustainability.
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The path to peace for Olympic stakeholders requires consideration of the
history of the IOC’s policies governing distribution of commercial revenue.
In 1966, when the IOC passed its first formal set of guidelines for the allocation of television revenue (known as the Rome Formula), the Olympic
Organizing Committee (OCOG) received 66.7 percent of the money. The remaining 33.3 percent was apportioned equally to the IOC, NOCs, and ISFs.
This formula applied for the first time to money from the sale of television
rights to the 1972 Sapporo and Munich Olympic Games,21 and it served
as the basis for the distribution of revenue through the 1994 Lillehammer
Olympic Winter Games despite numerous (and often successful) efforts
of OCOG leaders in the 1970s and 1980s to further enhance their shares
of the revenue pie.22 In response to these machinations, the IOC assumed
an increasingly greater profile in the negotiations with television network
representatives in the 1980s in order to prevent the OCOGs from signing
contracts detrimental to the IOC’s financial interests.23 The IOC established
a new distribution policy in advance of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics with 60
percent granted to the OCOG, and 40 percent directed to the IOC and its
Olympic family partners, a practice that continued through the 2002 Salt
Lake City Olympic Winter Games.
In 1995, Samaranch successfully championed a move to further enhance the amount of money flowing to Olympic organizations. His plan to
reduce an OCOG’s share of television money to 49 percent (down from 60
percent), and increase the Olympic Movement’s share to 51 percent (up from
40 percent) was challenged within the Executive Board by senior IOC members, Richard Pound, Anita DeFrantz, and Kevan Gosper. “An important
contribution to public sympathy for the Games,” stated Pound, the longtime chief negotiator of Olympic television deals in the U.S. and beyond,
“lay in the IOC’s being able to say that most of the revenue went towards
organizing the Games.” Paring the OCOG’s share “was neither necessary
nor popular,” he continued, and should not be undertaken “unless a need
for more revenue within the Olympic family could be demonstrated.” In
addition, he warned that if the IOC’s share of television revenue increased,
the IOC could expect an approach from the USOC for an increase on its
current ten percent share.24 Anita DeFrantz labeled a decision to limit an
OCOG’s portion to 49 percent, “a punitive gesture.”25 Gosper did not like
the optics of increasing the Olympic Movement’s share so quickly after the
most recent change in advance of the Atlanta Olympics or moving past the
50 percent line.26
Samaranch clearly wanted to distribute more money to the NOCs and
ISFs. He knew that the time to move forward with this change, to come into
effect for the 2004 Olympics, was in 1995 or 1996 while the 2004 bid cities
were actively seeking the right to host the Games. They were far less likely to
voice any opposition when attempting to court the IOC’s favor than after a
site had been selected in 1997.27 Holland’s Pál Schmitt backed Samaranch’s
plan to increase the amounts flowing to the ISFs and NOCs, as did fellow
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Executive Board member, Ashwini Kumar of India. Alexandre de Merode of
Belgium supported Samaranch’s proposal stating that the IOC’s expenses
might increase in the future if athletes demanded money for their participation in the Olympics. Samaranch’s victory was not a resounding one, as the
motion passed by a vote of 5-4 with 1 abstention.28 When François Carrard,
the IOC’s Director General, asked the group whether he should announce
the change at the upcoming lunchtime press briefing, a clearly displeased
Pound offered that “if the Executive Board was proud of its decision, it
should announce it straightaway.”29
When the IOC leadership sold this change in the public forum, one of
the principal supporting arguments was that the OCOG’s diminished share
of television revenue was offset by the increasing sums available from the
TOP program. Our position on the future distribution of television revenue
(in terms of the percentage share directed to the OCOGs) falls closer to the
opinion voiced by Richard Pound, when the IOC pondered the change in
September 1995. It is the OCOG and the host community that must stage
an Olympic festival and who bear the responsibility for ensuring that the
Games are well organized, complete with the facilities, transportation plan,
required accommodations, and necessary security. We are unconvinced that
the ISFs require the substantial sums flowing to them in the wake of the
2004 Athens Olympics. The ISFs are not required to abandon staging their
World Championships in an Olympic year, although this was an action
some took in the past, and therefore can not claim an inability to generate
their own revenue in an Olympic year as a justification for the receipt of
Olympic-generated money. In the 2005–2008 quadrennial, over $420 million was distributed to the ISFs governing sports on the Olympic Winter
and Olympic programs. 30 We are more sympathetic to the needs of the
NOCs who must feed, clothe, and transport their athletes who participate
in Olympic Games, and spearhead the promotion of the Olympic Movement and its values in their respective countries.31 At the close of 2009, the
IOC’s reserve fund rested at $466 million. The organization is in a position
to re-direct some of its share of Olympic revenue to other entities. Admittedly, until the IOC witnesses a decline in the number of cities willing to
accept the financial risk of hosting the Games under the current distribution
method for television and corporate sponsorship revenue, the IOC’s senior
leadership likely lacks the motivation to reduce the amount of money that
the members of the Olympic family receive.32 Samaranch hoped that the
enhanced revenues would empower the NOCs and ISFs to further develop
sport in a global context, but it cannot be ignored that when money flows,
good feelings follow, and this also fueled Samaranch’s use of money to assist
in maintaining good relations with the ISFs and NOCs in the latter years
of his presidency.
Our prescription for change favors the interests of the OCOGs and
challenges leaders in the Olympic Tripartite (the IOC, NOCs, including the
USOC, and ISFs) to act in the best interests of Olympic athletes and the
communities that accept the daunting task of hosting an Olympic Games.
While they will likely not be popular, at first glance, among many of those
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affiliated with the IOC, NOCs, and ISFs, all of whom experience a drop in
their shares of Olympic revenue under the plan, our proposals are designed
to prompt a meaningful and
necessary discussion in which all
Our prescription for change
of the aforementioned agencies
justify the large sums of money . . . challenges leaders in the
channeled to them.
Olympic Tripartite . . . to act

in the best interests of Olympic
Television Dollars
When the IOC Executive Board, athletes and the communities
at Samaranch’s urging, altered
the method of distributing tele- that accept the daunting task of
vision revenue from the 60/40 hosting an Olympic Games.
(OCOG/Olympic Movement)
split to the 51/49 (Olympic
Movement/OCOG) formula, the USOC pushed for a larger share than the
10 percent of the U.S. contract it had received since the establishment of the
Broadcast Marketing Agreement. Beginning with the 2004 Athens games,
the two sides agreed to divide the money from the U.S. television contract
into five portions: 49 percent for the OCOG and equal shares of 12.75 percent to the IOC, NOCs, ISFs, and USOC. All non-U.S. television contracts
adhered to the 51/49 distribution formula; however, it should be noted that
the USOC did not receive a direct share from this revenue source. This plan
remained in effect through the Turin/Beijing (2005–2008) quadrennial.
Today, the USOC maintains its 12.75 percent share of the U.S. television contract, while the IOC Executive Board determines the distribution
of the remaining portion of the Olympic Movement’s share of the U.S. and
non-U.S. television contracts following negotiations with the NOCs and
ISFs. The OCOGs in the current (Vancouver and London) and subsequent
quadrennials (Sochi and Rio) receive what is termed an “IOC Contribution”
in real U.S. dollars that does not have a direct percentage link to television
revenue from the U.S. or non-U.S. television contracts. It seems that OCOGs
now work under the assumption that they will not receive less in terms of
this “IOC Contribution” than the preceding OCOG, that there may not
necessarily share in any increases in revenue derived from the sale of Olympic television rights. Our preference is that the IOC employs a distribution
formula with defined percentages, if for no other reason than transparency,
and as a result, our proposals will use the former distribution plan as a base
(Table 1).
We support a move to a 55/45 (OCOG/Olympic Movement) split, with
a share of 11.25 percent flowing to the USOC, and 33.75 percent distributed
among the ISFs, NOCs, and IOC. We propose to reduce the debt faced by
many host communities by enhancing the funds available to the OCOGs
from television revenue, in addition to financial support from TOP. The
same 55/45 split would apply to all non-U.S. television contracts with the
IOC, ISFs, and NOCs, sharing the Olympic Movement portion as per the
current negotiations process; however, we advise that the NOCs’ share not
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be reduced. If the USOC seeks to supplement its revenue in light of these
reductions, it should approach its federal government, as do other NOCs,
or ramp up its own domestic sponsorship efforts.33
TOP Dollars
Currently, half of the TOP revenue in any quadrennial is directed towards
the Winter and Summer Organizing Committees (OCOGs), and the NOCs
(forty percent) and the IOC (ten percent) receive the remaining half. Solving the IOC/USOC dispute must not deduct from funds earmarked for the
OCOGs. Their fifty percent share remains sacrosanct, and we advise an eight
percent augmentation for the establishment of an Olympic Facilities Management Agency (OFMA), which would ensure that Olympic facilities serve
as temporary, but world-class, training facilities for aspiring Olympians as
well as a breeding ground for coaches. This legacy plan should be instituted
for a minimum of three years and would need to be thoroughly outlined
during the original bid process. The NOCs and each OFMA would also need
to establish cost-sharing plans for accommodations for those travelling to
the site following the close of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Many
bids revolve around the idea that an Olympic Village serve as a source of
low-income housing for the host community after an Olympic festival. We
do not seek to alter the mindset of bid committees concerning the merit of
this type of initiative, but we suggest perhaps twenty percent of the Olympic
Village be diverted to housing visiting athletes and coaches for a three-year
period as a critical element in maintaining the functionality of a world class
training facility. The OFMA could also make use of this accommodation
space as a youth hostel when not housing aspiring Olympians, as a source
of additional revenue. To assist in the generation of local jobs, people living
within the low-cost housing community could be employed as members of
the cleaning and maintenance staff of the portion of the Olympic Village
retained as an element of the athletic training infrastructure.
The additional eight percent directed at the OCOGs also has ramifications for the IOC and USOC: the IOC, cushioned by its $466 million reserve,
would accept a 7 percent share, the NOCs would still receive 20 percent,
and the USOC’s share would fall to 15 percent. This reduction returns the
USOC’s share to what it had been at the time of the program’s inception,
but still provides the USOC with a sizeable contribution, recognizes the
financial contribution of the U.S. market and the ASA, and maintains the
USOC in a revenue-sharing position not enjoyed by any of the world’s other
204 NOCs. With a 15 percent share of TOP revenue and an 11.25 percent
share of the U.S. television contract, not to mention its share of the television money sent to the NOCs through Olympic Solidarity, the USOC
maintains its privileged position.34
TOP Sustainability Partner: A New Initiative
In addition to suggesting reformed strategies for the distribution of television contract and TOP revenue, our “path to peace” proposal includes the
creation of a new sponsor category: the TOP Sustainability Partner. TOP
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Table 1. Turin-Beijing and Proposed Formulas
for Distribution of Television and TOP Revenue
		

Turin/Beijing Percent Share Proposed Percent Share

		

OCOG IOC ISFs NOCs USOC

US Television

49

38.25			

Non US Television 49
TOP Revenueiii

50

OCOG IOC ISFs NOCs USOC

12.75

55

33.75			

11.25

51			

0

55

45 			

0a

10

20

0

20

i

58

ii

7

0

20

15

While not receiving a dedicated share of the non-U.S. television money, the USOC does
receive a share of money, as do the other 204 NOCs, from the NOCs’ portion of the 51 percent
share for the Olympic Movement transferred through the Olympic Solidarity Program.
ii
Despite the reduction in the Olympic Movement’s share of non-U.S. television revenue from
51 percent to 45 percent, we propose the percentage of money directed to the NOCs remain
constant.
iii
The “Turin/Beijing Percent Share” formula for TOP Revenue, which is still used today, is
employed for the distribution of contributions of the majority of TOP sponsors. For a limited
number, based on product category, some modifications are made.
i

Sustainability Partner initiatives aim to make a difference in the social, economic, and athletic development of disadvantaged regions around the world
by capitalizing on the Olympic Movement’s global presence, supporting the
IOC’s stated commitment to enhancing sport as a tool for the improvement
of social and human well-being,35 and addressing ongoing criticisms of the
IOC and its dearth of social responsiblity initiatives.
Unlike traditional TOP sponsors, corporations vying for TOP Sustainability Partner status would submit proposals for a specified sustainability
project addressing the UN Millennium Development Goals. These proposals would be equal in dollar worth to traditional TOP sponsors—currently
around $100 million—and 55–65 percent of total funds would go establishing a project in a developing nation.36 For example, programs could include
building clean-water facilities, erecting hospitals or clinics dedicated to
child and maternal health, or retrofitting factories to reverse the loss of
environmental resources.
Rather than compete for TOP Sponsor status against other corporations within existing product or service categories (such as Coca Cola versus
Pepsi Cola or Visa versus American Express), TOP Sustainability Partner
applicants may come from any product or service category not already represented by current TOP Sponsors. For instance, the current TOP Sponsor
list37 does not include a sporting apparel company, leaving the TOP Sustainability Partner category open to companies such as Nike, Adidas, or Reebok
to submit proposals. Members of the IOC marketing commission, UN global
sustainability consultancies, and other governmental and non-governmental
institutions38 would comprise a bilateral commission that chooses, upon
IOC Executive Board appproval, the successful TOP Sustainability Partners.
Additionally, this committee would complete a semi-annual review of the
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state of on-going projects and the status of completed facilities in order to
exhibit a sound monitoring practice for the fund.
The remaining 35 percent to 45 percent from the successful TOP
Sustainability Partner’s proposition would be earmarked to provide assistance to aspiring Olympians in financial need, as well as making funds
available to help developing nations enhance their sport infrastructure. The
IOC would create two separate funds by equally splitting the remaining
35 to 45 percent (approximately $35 to 45 million, based on current TOP
Sponsorship commitments). NOCs from developing nations could apply
for support from one fund managed in Lausanne by IOC staff members to
financially assist in clearly defined sporting infrastructure projects, such as
stadia and training facilities. A special committee comprised of one active
NOC representative nominated from each continent (and approved by the
Association of Olympic Committees), as well as an ad hoc group from the
current IOC Executive Board, including the Chairman of Olympic Solidarity
and at minimum three other members of the Olympic Solidarity Commission, would decide which projects receive funding. NOCs that receive funds
would be required to submit quarterly project reports until the construction
phase of any project has concluded, complete with financial records, and
semi-annual reports thereafter on the function of the facility in question
for a period of five years.
The second fund, similarly controlled and managed by IOC personnel in Lausanne, would provide a reserve from which athletes can apply for
need-based bursaries to offset clearly articulated training, equipment, or
ancillary support costs. For instance, an Indonesian pole vaulter may apply
for funds to cover expenses for a new carbon fiber pole, three weeks of expert
coaching hosted at an Indonesian track and field facility, and training for
two weeks at one of the proposed Olympic “legacy” sites. A committee consisting of an NOC representative from each continent as well as the existing
IOC Athletes’ Commission—a body comprised of athletes elected by fellow
Olympians—would adjudicate the athlete bursary applications.
Summary
Our purpose in advancing these proposals concerning modifications to
means employed to both distribute and generate Olympic revenue is multifold. First and foremost, we believe that the IOC and USOC must form a
true partnership that resolves the current dispute and recognizes that the
Olympic Movement is stronger when their mutual interests are served. Also,
we sought to contribute to this dialogue. Second, we assert that impending discussions between the IOC and the USOC offer stakeholders in the
Olympic Movement an important opportunity to reflect on issues extending
well beyond the microcosmic situation involving Lausanne and Colorado
Springs. Central among these issues is our belief that a greater proportion
of the money generated from television rights sales and corporate sponsorship should be transferred to OCOGs. In addition, the ambulatory mission
of the Games, while laudable, has created too many “white elephant” stadia
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and their potential benefits in terms of athlete development are not realized.
Hence, we propose the development of a formalized three-year legacy plan
for the use of Olympic facilities to support aspiring Olympians from around
the globe. This plan would afford host cities (and their business communities) additional streams of revenue while athletes, coaches, and support staff
visited for training purposes, not to mention the visitors and spectators
who would spend money in the communities for any competitions (exhibition tournaments, regional or world championships) staged at the former
Olympic facilities during the three-year period following the conclusion
of the Games. Fourth, can this wider dialogue concerning the generation
and distribution of Olympic revenue provide an opportunity for the IOC
to augment its commitment to sustainability and social responsibility? We
believe so, and this is why we have proposed the development of the TOP
Sustainability Partners for companies seeking a hybrid sponsorship that
would elevate their profile within the elite athlete and sport development
domain (bursary program for athletes in need) as well as the developing
world (NOC support), thus demonstrating their commitment to social responsibility (major infrastructural project in the developing world).
It is clear from the recent efforts of IOC officials and USOC representatives to open dialogue on the “games cost” issue that the possibility for a
new era in terms of communication and trust between the two bodies is real.
Their respective leaders deserve plaudits for making this happen. We believe
that the next round of discussions concerning the USOC’s share of Olympic
revenue from television rights and corporate sponsorship offers avenues of
discussion beyond the terms of their future financial relationship and that
those same avenues of discussion provide means for the Olympic Movement
to address the worthy goals of social responsibility and sustainability.
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A proactive approach to revenue distribution whereby the OCOG share of revenue is
enhanced might have important tangible benefits beyond what we suggest, namely the extended use of Olympic competition venues. The IOC hardly wants to revisit a time in which
the number of bid cities dwindles. In the 1970s and 1980s, this circumstance resulted from
bid city wariness as a result of world geopolitics, the hazards of the boycott era, and the
prospect for crushing debt (witness Montreal, 1976). We see our suggestion to elevate the
OCOG share of Olympic television and corporate sponsorship money as a wise ‘stimulus
plan’ to offset any chilling effect on future bids resulting from the challenges faced by numerous economies in the new global order.
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